OpenVinoDAO Smart Contract Design and Tokenomics

Overview

OpenVinoDAO is introducing a utility token with a fixed supply of 10 million tokens, allocated equally across four key stakeholder groups. The tokenomics design (based on the OpenVino “Purple Paper”) includes special mechanisms to manage the token’s launch and value over time. These include an initial distribution with vesting/lock-up for founders, a public sale for investors with tiered pricing, a Liquidity Event that launches the token on the market under certain conditions, and an automated token split mechanism that increases token supply when the market price reaches defined thresholds (analogous to stock splits). In addition, the OpenVinoDAO token will serve as the incentive currency for OviSync (Netrabrick) nodes, rewarding node operators for uptime and network participation. This report details the smart contract architecture and logic to implement these features, with technical recommendations and pseudocode for developers and tokenomics planners.

Token Distribution and Initial Allocation

Upon deployment, the total supply of 10,000,000 OpenVinoDAO tokens will be minted and allocated to four designated wallets (or token holder contracts) as follows:

• Founders – 2,500,000 tokens (25%): Allocated to the founding team. These tokens are locked and non-transferrable until a liquidity event occurs (to prevent early dumping and align founders with long-term success). This is essentially a time/condition-based vesting: all founder tokens remain frozen until the project reaches the market launch milestone. After the liquidity event, founder tokens unlock and can be transferred or sold. (Implementation detail: The token contract or a vesting contract will enforce this lock-up.)

• Investors (Public Sale) – 2,500,000 tokens (25%): Reserved for public sale to investors. The sale will be conducted in phases or rounds with preferential pricing for early buyers – i.e. earlier rounds offer a lower price per token, rewarding early risk-takers . For example, the first 1,2500,000 tokens will be sold at 2.5 tokens per $1, and the next 1,250,000 at 1 token per $1. A smart contract (crowdsale contract) will manage this distribution, accepting payments (USDC) and releasing tokens to buyers. The contract will track the number of tokens sold and automatically move to the next price tier once a round’s allocation is exhausted. This ensures fairness and transparency in pricing during the token sale.

• DevOps Treasury – 2,500,000 tokens (25%): Held in the DevOps wallet (the project’s treasury). These tokens are earmarked for providing liquidity and supporting the token’s market (e.g. seeding DEX liquidity pools) and for other treasury needs (partnerships, future development, liquidity incentives, etc.). Notably, a large portion of this allocation will be used during the Liquidity Event (paired with project-raised funds to create an initial market). Until then, these tokens are kept in a multi-signature wallet with restricted access, to be deployed only for treasury purposes.

• Attractor Pool (Community Rewards) – 2,500,000 tokens (25%): Allocated to an “Attractor” wallet dedicated to community growth initiatives. These tokens will reward early winery adopters, partners and contributors, and participants of the YDIYOI program (“You Do It, You Own It”). This approach of distributing tokens to the community helps bootstrap adoption and engagement. The attractor wallet’s balance will gradually decrease as these tokens are given out to grow the ecosystem.

Smart Contract Implementation for Distribution: The base token will be an ERC-20 contract (OpenZeppelin’s standard can be used for safety) initialized with the 10 million supply split between the four addresses above. The contract should implement measures to enforce the lock-up on founder tokens and possibly to facilitate the sale mechanics:

• Founder Lock-Up: One straightforward method is to use a token timelock or conditional lock contract for the founder allocation. For instance, the founder tokens can initially be held by a TokenTimelock contract (with the founder as beneficiary) that only releases tokens when the liquidity event condition is met (the condition can be represented as a timestamp or an external call that triggers release). Alternatively, the ERC-20 contract itself can override the transfer function to disallow transfers from founder-designated addresses until an unlock flag is set. For example:

  bool public liquidityEventOccurred = false; mapping(address => bool) public isFounder; function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override { if (!liquidityEventOccurred) { require(!isFounder[from], "Founder tokens locked until liquidity event"); } super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount); } // ... after deployment, mark founder addresses and set liquidityEventOccurred=true when appropriate.

  In this pseudocode, any transfer from a founder address is blocked if the liquidity event hasn’t happened. Once the event triggers, the contract sets liquidityEventOccurred = true (by calling an unlockFounderTokens() function or as part of the liquidity event function), thereby lifting the restriction.

• Investor Sale Contract: A separate Crowdsale contract will handle the public sale. This contract will hold the 2.5M investor tokens (transferred from the token contract or minted directly to it) and release them against incoming payments. It maintains state for sale rounds, token price, and tokens sold. Pseudocode outline:

  contract TokenSale { address public token; uint256 public tokensSold; uint8 public currentRound; uint256 public tokenPrice; // in WEI or in USD if using stablecoin payment // Define round thresholds and prices struct Round { uint256 cap; uint256 price; } Round[] public rounds; constructor(address tokenAddr) { token = tokenAddr; // e.g., define 3 rounds: rounds.push(Round({ cap: 1_000_000 * 1e18, price: 0.00025 ether })); // 0.00025 ETH ≈ $0.50 rounds.push(Round({ cap: 2_000_000 * 1e18, price: 0.00037 ether })); // $0.75 rounds.push(Round({ cap: 2_500_000 * 1e18, price: 0.0005 ether })); // $1.00 } function buyTokens(uint256 amount) external payable { require(currentRound < rounds.length, "Sale ended"); uint256 cost = amount * rounds[currentRound].price; require(msg.value >= cost, "Insufficient ETH sent"); // transfer tokens to buyer: IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amount); tokensSold += amount; // check if round cap reached: if (tokensSold >= rounds[currentRound].cap) { currentRound++; } } }

  In this example, the sale contract iterates through predefined rounds. Early rounds have a lower price per token. Once tokensSold reaches the cap for the current round, it advances to the next round (raising the price). Any excess ETH sent is not handled in this snippet for brevity (in practice, you’d refund overpayment or require exact amounts). This contract would need to be funded with the 2.5M tokens (which could be done by the token contract mint or transfer during initialization). Investors send USDC and receive tokens immediately. All proceeds (USDC raised) are stored in DevOps wallet.

• Attractor Distribution: For community rewards, a flexible approach is needed since distribution criteria may vary (airdrop to holders, rewards for specific tasks, etc.). The Attractor wallet (could be a multi-sig or a dedicated contract) can perform transfers to users as needed. Since these tokens are given away to stimulate adoption, no payment is required from users – only proof of fulfilling the criteria (i.e. new winery approved to mint wine tokens on OpenVino.exchange. The token contract doesn’t need special logic for this beyond normal transfers (the attractor wallet just sends tokens out). The main rule to watch is that the attractor allocation is finite – once the 2.5M is exhausted (or even before), it serves as one trigger for the liquidity event (as described next).

Liquidity Event Contract (Market Launch Mechanism)

Definition: The “Liquidity Event” is a one-time trigger that launches the OpenVinoDAO token on the open market by creating a liquidity pool for the token once certain conditions are met. According to the specifications, the liquidity event occurs when either the entire 2.5M investor allocation is sold or the Attractor reward pool is depleted – whichever comes first. This condition indicates that the token sale phase or initial distribution phase has completed, and it’s time to establish market liquidity and allow free trading.

Trigger Conditions: The smart contracts should continuously (or periodically) check for one of two conditions:

1. All investor tokens sold: The public sale contract reports 2,500,000 tokens sold to investors. (In the sale contract, this could be tokensSold >= 2.5e6.)

2. Attractor pool empty: The attractor wallet’s balance hits zero (meaning all 2.5M community tokens have been distributed). This could be checked via the token contract balance of the attractor address.

In practice, the Liquidity Event can be triggered by a function call once a condition is met. This could be done by an off-chain script or a Keeper service monitoring conditions, or even by the sale or attractor contracts themselves (for example, the final token sold in the sale could call the trigger function). The design should allow a single trigger only once, even if both conditions become true around the same time (to avoid double execution).

Actions on Liquidity Event: When triggered, the Liquidity Event performs the following steps atomically:

• Create a Liquidity Pool on a DEX (Viniswap.openvino.org): The contract will provide liquidity by pairing OpenVinoDAO tokens from the DevOps Treasury with USDC to initialize a trading market. The target initial price is $1 per token. For example, if using a Token/USDC pair on Viniswap, the contract would deposit 1 USDC for each 1 OpenVino token. This ensures the initial pool price reflects the intended $1.00 value. Providing liquidity via a smart contract involves calling the DEX’s router contract – e.g., Viniswap (Uniswap V2 fork) addLiquidity() function – with the token and counterpart asset. The contract must supply equal value of both sides of the pair at the time of pooling to avoid instant arbitrage. In code, this will look like:

  IUniswapV2Router router = IUniswapV2Router(UNISWAP_ROUTER_ADDRESS); IERC20(token).approve(address(router), tokenAmount); // If using USDC: IERC20(USDC).approve(address(router), usdcAmount); router.addLiquidity( address(token), address(USDC), tokenAmount, usdcAmount, tokenAmount, // min amounts (slippage tolerance can be 0 or small) usdcAmount, address(treasury), // LP tokens recipient (treasury can hold the LP tokens) block.timestamp );

  The goal is that after this step, a Viniswap pair contract exists (Token-USDC) with an initial price of 1 token per $1.00.

• Unlock Trading: At the moment of liquidity provision, the token effectively becomes freely tradable. The smart contract should at this point lift any transfer restrictions that were in place pre-launch. This means flipping the liquidityEventOccurred flag in the token contract to true (as shown in the _beforeTokenTransfer logic above) to unlock founder tokens and any other paused transfers. After this, all token holders (founders, investors, community members) can freely transfer or sell their tokens on the open market. The “Liquidity Event” is essentially the token’s listing event.

• Record and Emit Event: The contract should emit a LiquidityEventTriggered event for transparency, logging the block timestamp and which condition was met (soldOut or attractorEmpty). This helps with off-chain indexing and community awareness that the token is now live.

Design of Liquidity Event Contract: This could be a dedicated contract (say LiquidityEventManager) or integrated into the TokenSale contract. One approach is to give the sale contract the additional responsibility of triggering the event once sale complete or community pool empty. Alternatively, an admin or DAO multi-sig can call a triggerLiquidityEvent() function when they manually observe the conditions met. For trustless automation, one could have a public function that anyone can call, which internally checks the conditions and proceeds if true (to avoid reliance on a single party). For example:

In this pseudocode, tokensSold would be known to the contract (if it’s the sale contract itself), and the attractor address balance is checked on the token contract. Before calling, the DevOps token allocation and the corresponding USDC need to be provided or approved to this contract. The function then calls addLiquidity. The minAmounts in addLiquidity are set equal to desired amounts for simplicity – in practice, one might allow a tiny slippage. We also specify the recipient of LP tokens (the ownership of the liquidity pool tokens); here it’s a treasury wallet so the project holds the LP tokens (which can later be managed or staked). After adding liquidity, it calls unlockFounderTokens() on the token (which would set liquidityEventOccurred=true inside the token or otherwise remove transfer restrictions). This makes founder (and any previously locked) tokens freely transferable. At this point, the OpenVinoDAO token is officially live on the market at ~$1 starting price, and regular market forces take over.

Initial Market Dynamics: By executing the above, OpenVinoDAO ensures a smooth launch: early investors get liquidity (they can trade their tokens on the Viniswap DEX), the community can trade, and the price discovery continues organically. The starting price being controlled helps avoid extreme volatility at the first trade. It’s important to note that once the pool is live, arbitrage will ensure the DEX price stays in line with any external markets. If any founder or community member tries to sell a lot, the price may drop; if there is high demand, the price will rise. The next part of the design addresses how the protocol can respond when the price rises beyond certain thresholds.

Automated Token Split Mechanism (Elastic Supply Adjustment)

OpenVinoDAO plans to implement automatic token splits when the token’s market value reaches predefined thresholds. This is analogous to stock splits in traditional equities – when the price gets “too high,” the supply is increased and the price per token is roughly halved, making the token more affordable per unit without changing overall holder value.

The goal is to keep the token price in a target range (e.g., around $1–$2 in this design) by doubling the supply at key points, so new investors are not discouraged by a high price per token (even though market cap is what matters). More importantly, maintaining a price range for OpenVinoDAO tokens insures that YDIYOI rewards (1 token) and new winery access to OpenVino services (2,500 tokens) remain relatively stable.

Trigger and Thresholds: If the market price hits $2.00, we trigger a 1:1 split (meaning every holder gets an additional token for each token they own, effectively 2-for-1). We can infer that subsequent thresholds might be higher; perhaps every time the price doubles from the initial $1, a split is triggered. For instance: $2 → 2-for-1 split; if price later hits $4 → another split; maybe $8 → another, etc. The exact values and split ratios will be defined in the contract. Each split event increases total supply and all balances by the same proportion, so the relative ownership of each holder stays the same; the market price per token should theoretically adjust downward by that factor (approximately halving when doubling supply) if market cap remains steady.

Price Oracle: To implement this on-chain, the contract needs a reliable price feed for the OpenVino token in USD (or in ETH, convertible to USD). This can be done via an oracle – for example, a price feed can be set up after the token is liquid and traded. The contract can use the Viniswap pair itself as a price source, using the constant product reserve ratio to derive price, or a TWAP (time-weighted average price) oracle from the DEX. A secure approach is to rely on Chainlink or a similar decentralized oracle network: off-chain or node operators report the price and the oracle contract provides a public getPrice() function (How Chainlink Price Feeds Work - RareSkills). For example, if the token is paired with USDC on Viniswap, we can use a Token/USDC on-chain value. This is a technical detail; the key is that the smart contract can query the current price in USDC at any time.

Implementing the Split: There are a few ways to implement the split logic:

• Direct Minting to Holders: Conceptually, upon trigger, the contract needs to mint new tokens equal to the current circulating supply and distribute them proportionally to all existing holders (1 new token per 1 existing token for a 1:1 split). A naive implementation would iterate through every holder address and update their balance. However, tracking all token holders within a contract is not trivial (standard ERC-20 doesn’t store an iterable list of holders) and iterating a large list in one transaction could exceed gas limits. This approach is impractical if the number of holders is large.

• Rebase Mechanism (Scaling Factor): A more elegant solution is to design the token as a rebase/elastic supply token (Rebase Tokens Guide: What Are They & How Do They Work? | Koinly). In a rebase design, the token contract doesn’t directly keep a fixed balance mapping that sums to a static total supply. Instead, it might keep a “scaled” balance. For example, it stores a global factor that represents how many actual tokens each “unit” in an account balance represents. If a split occurs, instead of crediting each address, the contract multiplies this global factor or updates an index such that all balances when read appear doubled. This is how coins like Ampleforth (AMPL) work – they adjust a scaling factor so that wallet balances change uniformly based on supply target. Implementing this requires more complex math but is gas-efficient for mass updates (one state change affects all holders uniformly). For instance: maintain totalSupply and gonsPerFragment variables; each account’s balance is stored in “gons” (an invariant unit), and actual balance = gons / gonsPerFragment. On a 2:1 split, you’d halve gonsPerFragment (meaning each holder’s actual balance reading doubles, since the divisor got half as small) and double totalSupply. All this can happen in one transaction without looping through accounts.

• Snapshot and Airdrop: Another possible approach is off-chain computation of the distribution, followed by an on-chain merkle airdrop of the additional tokens. For example, at the moment price crosses $2, one could snapshot all balances (using an off-chain script or an on-chain snapshot mechanism like ERC20Snapshot), then create a merkle tree of those balances, and have a contract where each holder can claim their extra tokens. However, this introduces more complexity and relies on off-chain processes, which might not be ideal for a fully automated protocol.

Given these options, using a rebase-style design is likely the most seamless for automation. For clarity, we can illustrate a simpler (but less efficient) logic and note it should be replaced with a scalable mechanism:

In this pseudo-code, allTokenHolders is not trivial to obtain on-chain; this is just conceptual. In reality, you would not loop like this. Instead, one might use an event or external script to do distribution. The key idea is that totalSupply doubles and each balance doubles. A better contract design would be:

Here, every balance and transfer is managed in “base units” such that adjusting scalingFactor effectively multiplies everyone’s balance. If scalingFactor doubles (1→2), then balanceOf will report double the tokens for each account. This pattern avoids iterating through accounts. The contract would call executeSplit(2,1) when the oracle condition is met. We emit a Transfer event for bookkeeping, but note that in a rebase model, some projects emit fake transfers from the null address to each holder to indicate balances have increased – but that’s optional for UI purposes.

Adjusting Thresholds: After each split, the contract should set the next price threshold. A simple pattern is geometric progression: triggering a split every time the token “re-reaches” a $2 valuation. Each time a split occurs, increment the index so the next threshold is in effect. This prevents multiple splits happening at once if the price rockets past multiple levels – ideally it should only do one split at a time and then recalibrate.

Oracle Update Frequency: It’s not practical for the token contract itself to constantly monitor price every block. Instead, we can use a pull-based check (someone has to call checkAndExecuteSplit() function to trigger it). This could be anyone (e.g., an arbitrageur or arbitrage bot might call it once price is high, since after the split the price per token will roughly halve – there could be a profit opportunity by calling it at a certain time). Or the project can run a keeper to call it when needed. The function should be public and permissionless but gated by the condition. To incentivize public callers, the contract might give a small reward (like a few tokens) to the caller of a successful split trigger, compensating their gas. This ensures someone will trigger it.

Economic Effect: When a split happens, if the market cap is $X and price per token was $2, after doubling supply the price per token should ideally adjust to ~$1. This keeps the token “affordable” while market cap remains $X (just distributed over more tokens). All holders get their balances doubled, so no one loses value; new investors see a lower unit price which might be psychologically appealing. It’s worth noting this is largely optical – similar to how a stock split doesn’t change a company’s valuation, just the share price. However, in crypto, such mechanisms can confuse users or cause volatility as the market adjusts. It’s crucial to clearly communicate this feature to token holders to avoid panic or misunderstanding when their balance suddenly increases and price per token decreases.

Security and Implementation Notes: The split mechanism should be carefully tested. The use of an oracle introduces a dependency – it must be secure and up-to-date. One must handle cases like oracle outages or manipulation (perhaps require the price to hold above threshold for a certain duration or use a time-weighted price). Also, consider if the split should happen only when price sustains above $2, not just a momentary spike. The design could include a requirement like “price >= $2 for N consecutive blocks or an average over 1 hour >= $2” to prevent quick pump-and-dump triggering a split needlessly.

Finally, ensure that certain accounts (like the Liquidity pool, if holding some tokens, or the sale contracts) also respect the split. In a rebase model, even tokens in the Uniswap pool or in the unsold portion of sale would scale up. If using a simpler mint approach, one must also mint tokens to the unsold allocation holders (e.g., if the DevOps wallet still has reserve tokens, it also gets doubled amount). Essentially all tokens everywhere are affected. A rebase changes balances uniformly including the LP contract’s balance, keeping ratios the same. This is another reason to prefer it.

In summary, the automated split is a form of algorithmic supply adjustment similar to how some elastic tokens operate: “the supply is algorithmically adjusted to control price” (Rebase Tokens Guide: What Are They & How Do They Work? | Koinly). This mechanism will require rigorous smart contract testing but can be implemented to run trustlessly, ensuring no manual intervention is needed to carry out the splits once the code and oracle are in place.

Incentivizing OviSync (Netrabrick) Nodes with OpenVino Tokens

The OpenVinoDAO token is not just a governance or utility token; it’s also intended as the base incentive for OviSync network nodes. OviSync (built with the Netrabrick solution) refers to the network of nodes (run by wineries and community members) that provide decentralized infrastructure for OpenVino – e.g., blockchain endpoints, IPFS pinning, IoT data relays, and possibly on-premise data processing at wineries (as hinted by project descriptions). To encourage individuals or businesses to run these nodes, OpenVinoDAO will reward them in OpenVinoDAO tokens. This design is similar to how other decentralized networks operate: Helium, for example, rewards Hotspot operators with HNT tokens for providing wireless coverage (Understanding Helium: A Comprehensive Overview | Messari), distributing tokens as an incentive for network growth.

Node Assumptions: We assume on the order of 100–300 nodes will participate (at least initially). Nodes earn rewards primarily based on uptime (and possibly quality of service). Uptime can be measured as the percentage of time a node is online and performing its duties in a given period. There might also be other criteria (such as bandwidth provided, data relayed, tasks completed, etc.), but the prompt specifically mentions uptime, so we focus on that.

Reward Pool and Rate: We need to estimate how many tokens will be spent on node rewards and whether this is sustainable. Let’s break it down:

• If there are 100–300 nodes, we should decide how many tokens per node per period (say per month or per year) would be a meaningful incentive. This depends on token value and desired reward in USD or other terms. For a rough model, assume the token is around $1 (initially). We might target an annual reward of, say, $1000–$5000 per node (just a guess to make running a node worthwhile). At $1/token, that’s 1000–5000 tokens per node per year.

• For 200 nodes (midpoint of 100–300), if each gets say 2000 tokens/year on average, that’s 400,000 tokens per year distributed as rewards. This is 4% of the total 10M supply per year. That seems high for a long-term inflation if we had a fixed supply. However, remember that the supply can increase with splits (though splits don’t create value, they just create quantity – but they do mint new tokens which could potentially be allocated for such purposes).

• Perhaps the project might allocate a portion of the initial supply specifically for node incentives (for example, the Attractor 2.5M could partly be used here, or the DevOps pool). If 2.5M tokens are set aside for incentives, at 400k/year, that pool would last ~6.25 years. Not bad for initial bootstrapping. By that time, hopefully the network and token value have grown so that either fewer tokens can be given (because each token is more valuable) or governance can decide to introduce new token issuance.

• Another angle: if the token’s market price rises over time, the protocol might reduce the number of tokens given out to keep the dollar-value of rewards stable. This could happen naturally if the reward is a fixed amount of tokens; then if token goes above $1, the nodes actually get more USD value than initially expected. The DAO could vote to adjust the reward schedule periodically.

• Sustainability Model: One way to sustain node incentives is to treat it similarly to a block reward or staking reward system – effectively an inflationary issuance dedicated to node rewards. For example, the protocol could have an ongoing inflation of X% of supply per year that is allocated to node operators. Many PoS networks do this (e.g., 5% inflation to pay validators). If OpenVinoDAO decides on, say, 2% inflation for node rewards, that’s 200,000 tokens in year 1 (with 10M supply), which would get split among nodes. If splits occur and supply increases, 2% of a larger supply becomes more tokens, but presumably the value per token might be lower – the net effect needs economic analysis but can be tuned. The “splits” feature, however, is not exactly intended as inflation for rewards – it’s more cosmetic for price. If using a rebase design, one has to be careful if minting new tokens for rewards in addition to splits, to not double-count or break the peg mechanism. It might be cleaner to allocate a fixed pool from the get-go for rewards.

Given that the Purple Paper specifically called out using existing tokens as base incentives, the intention is to use the pre-minted supply rather than an endless inflation. So likely, a portion of the 10M (like the attractor or part of DevOps) is meant for node rewards distribution over a certain period. We should then propose a structure for distributing that efficiently and fairly:

Reward Mechanism: We can implement a Node Rewards contract. This contract would handle registration of nodes and the periodic payment of rewards. Key elements:

• Node Registration: Each node operator could register their node’s address (or the address where they want to receive rewards). Possibly they stake a small amount of tokens or provide proof they are a valid node (maybe a signature from the node’s server, etc.). A simple approach: maintain a list or mapping of nodeAddress -> NodeInfo which includes data like last claim time, uptime stats, etc.

• Uptime Reporting: How to get uptime info on-chain? If nodes are off-chain servers, we might use an oracle or a monitoring service that updates the contract. For example, each node could periodically call a heartbeat function reportOnline() to record that it’s up. The contract could count the number of heartbeats or the time since last heartbeat for each node to gauge uptime. Alternatively, a centralized tracker (or decentralized oracle network) could compute uptime percentages for each node over a period and then call the contract with those values to distribute rewards. For security, a decentralized approach is preferable, but given 100-300 nodes, the DAO might run its own monitoring and then feed a merkle distribution of rewards.

• Reward Calculation: Suppose we distribute rewards monthly. At the end of each month, the contract looks at all nodes and calculates each node’s reward based on uptime. A simple model: if a node was online 95% of the time or more, it’s “fully rewarded” say 100 tokens for the month. If it was less, it might get a pro-rated amount (or no reward if below a threshold). Or we allocate a fixed total pool per month (say 20,000 tokens per month for all nodes) and split it among nodes proportional to their uptime score. For example, Node A had 0.95 uptime, Node B 0.80, etc., sum up all uptime scores and split 20k tokens in that ratio. This incentivizes maximizing uptime to get a bigger share.

• Distribution: The contract can then either allow each node to claim their reward or directly push the reward to them. Given 100-300 nodes, a single transaction could potentially pay all (300 transfers is borderline but might be okay with gas ~ maybe 300*~21k = ~6.3 million gas, which is high but possibly within a block gas limit on some chains; on Ethereum mainnet that might be too high). So it may be better to either do in batches or let nodes individually claim their reward after the contract calculates it (posting merkle roots or storing the amount owed in a mapping).

To illustrate, an approachable solution: each node calls ping() periodically. We keep a simple uptime score (reset each month). At month-end, an admin calls finalizeRewards() which:

• tallies the uptime scores,

• computes each reward,

• updates a rewards[addr] mapping with the amount for that month,

• possibly emits an event with a merkle root if doing off-chain calc.

Nodes then call claimReward() to get their tokens.

Alternatively, a fully automated contract might loop, but we can avoid that by user-driven claims.

Example Pseudocode:

This pseudo-contract outlines a basic mechanism. It lacks many details (like how to retrieve all node addresses – we might need to store them in an array on registration, which is manageable for a few hundred nodes). The admin (which could be later transferred to a DAO governance contract) triggers finalizeAndDistribute at the end of each period. The rewards are stored and then each node claims. This avoids a massive gas loop for transfers in one go, at the cost of requiring each node to execute a claim transaction.

Economics: If we allocate 20k tokens per month as in the example, that’s 240k per year. That lies in the earlier estimate range and would deplete 2.5M in about 10 years if token value and number of nodes remain similar. However, if the network grows beyond 300 nodes or token economics change, this parameter can be adjusted. The smart contract could allow the admin/DAO to adjust monthlyRewardPool as needed (perhaps even dynamically based on remaining budget or token price).

Another consideration: to ensure longevity, the DAO might implement a halving schedule or decay for the rewards. For instance, distribute 2.5M over 5 years, then taper off. Or every year reduce the monthly pool by X%. This mimics how Helium halves its emissions every two years (Mining and Token Rewards | Helium Documentation), or how Bitcoin halves mining rewards, to prolong the emission curve. A sustainable model could be: Year1: 5% of pool, Year2: 4%, … decreasing to 0 over time, relying on the assumption that by then transaction fees or other value flows can take over incentivization.

Using Token Value for Incentives: If OpenVino’s platform generates revenue (say wineries pay fees to use the platform), those could potentially be used to buy back tokens or fund node rewards, creating a revenue-backed model rather than pure inflation. While not asked, it’s a related sustainability idea: ensure that either new value is coming in to justify the tokens given out or that the inflation is moderate enough not to erode the value.

In summary, rewarding the OviSync nodes with OpenVinoDAO tokens aligns incentives: operators are compensated in tokens that represent the success of the network they are supporting. If they maintain high uptime and the network grows, the tokens may increase in value, further rewarding them. By estimating a reasonable token expenditure (e.g., a few hundred thousand tokens per year for node rewards), the project can budget the 10M supply to last a number of years. During that time, hopefully the usage of the platform grows such that either the token’s market cap is much higher (making even small token rewards valuable) or governance can decide on a new tokenomics phase (like enabling a modest annual inflation or introducing fees to fund rewards).

Real-world analogy: This approach is akin to Helium’s model, where operators supply infrastructure and are paid in tokens for contributing to network coverage and reliability (Understanding Helium: A Comprehensive Overview | Messari). It creates a decentralized network of hardware without the project having to maintain all the infrastructure centrally – instead, community members do it for token rewards. The design we propose ensures that OpenVinoDAO’s tokens have a utility (node incentivization) beyond speculative trading, anchoring them to the growth of a real network (which is healthy for long-term token value).

Recommendations and Considerations

Smart Contract Security & Best Practices: Each of the contract components outlined (Token, Sale, Liquidity, Split, Node Rewards) should be implemented with well-audited libraries and patterns. Use OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC-20, ownable access control, timelocks, etc., to reduce risk. Critical functions like the liquidity event trigger and the token split function should have safeguards (e.g., can only happen once, or can only happen when oracle price is fresh) to avoid mis-execution. Testing these in various scenarios (simulation of price changes, partially sold tokens, etc.) is crucial.

Governance: While a lot of the tokenomics is encoded in smart contracts, consider what parameters might need adjustment and ensure the DAO (token holders governance) can control them if necessary. For example, the list of split thresholds, the size of node reward pool, or even the decision to trigger a liquidity event slightly earlier or later – these could be governed by a multi-sig or DAO vote. One might implement upgradable contracts or admin-controlled variables that can later be decentralized to the DAO.

Transparency: All these mechanisms (vesting, liquidity provisioning, splits, rewards) should be clearly communicated to the community. The smart contracts can help by emitting events and perhaps providing public getter functions for status (e.g., isLiquidityEventTriggered(), howManySplitsDone(), remainingAttractorTokens(), etc.). This way, stakeholders can track progress (for instance, how close the sale is to 2.5M, or how many tokens remain for community rewards). Transparency builds trust, especially since such tokenomics mechanics (particularly auto-splits) are unusual in the crypto space.

Economic Analysis: It’s recommended to simulate different scenarios: If the token demand is very high and the price keeps doubling, how many splits could happen in a year and what the supply would become? Would that dampen the price too much or confuse markets? Also, if the token price doesn’t rise much, no splits happen – is that fine? (Likely yes, splits are only a tool for high price scenarios). For node rewards, simulate the cost: if 300 nodes all maintain high uptime, how quickly do we use up the reward pool? This will inform if the monthly reward allocation we choose is appropriate or needs dynamic adjustment.

Example Scenario Walk-through:

• At launch, 10M tokens exist. Founders hold 2.5M (locked), sale contract has 2.5M to sell, DevOps has 2.5M, attractor 2.5M.

• The sale sells out all 2.5M to investors in a few weeks (maybe raising ~$1.75M if average price ~$0.70). Meanwhile, 1M tokens from attractor are distributed to early users. Now sale condition is met (2.5M sold).

• Liquidity event triggers: It uses the, say, $1.75M raised to pair with 1.75M tokens from DevOps at $0.70 initial price (if they chose to seed at a weighted average price). Or the team decides to top up to make it $1 per token, adding extra funds. Either way, a pool is created and trading begins. Founders still can’t sell until now – but now they are unlocked.

• Early trading pushes the price up above $2 after some months due to demand. The contract’s oracle reports price $2+, and the first split executes. The 5M tokens circulating (investors+community roughly, since founders might be holding) become 10M, total supply 20M. Founders now have 5M (doubled from 2.5M), DevOps maybe still has 0.75M left (doubled from 0.375M if some was used), etc. Price per token roughly goes to $1. The market cap remains whatever it was (~$20M if price was $2 on 10M supply). Now more people can buy at ~$1 again and perhaps the cycle repeats if demand continues.

• Meanwhile, node rewards are being distributed. The first year, suppose 150 nodes on average, each got e.g. 1,600 tokens. That’s 240k tokens used. Those tokens likely came from the attractor or DevOps allocation. With the split, note that any tokens left in the reward pool also doubled, extending the runway. (For example, if 2M tokens were left for rewards pre-split, after split it becomes 4M, and if price halved, effectively the value is same but quantity more to continue rewards.) This interestingly means the split mechanism can help prolong the token supply for incentives in terms of token count (though not in value terms).

• Over several years, perhaps a couple more splits occur if the project is very successful (price hitting $4, $8 etc., each time doubling supply). By then, the node network might have grown, but the token supply also grew, and the DAO could allocate some of the newly minted tokens (that the treasury now holds due to splits) to keep incentivizing nodes.

Conclusion: The proposed smart contract system provides a comprehensive framework for OpenVinoDAO’s token launch and utility:

• It ensures fair initial distribution and prevents premature selling by insiders (founder lock-up until the project is ready for market) (Token Vesting: Everything You Need to Know).

• It raises funding through a transparent sale with discounted early-bird rounds (Token distribution and fundraising models: an overview), while also engaging the community via airdrops/bounties (Token distribution and fundraising models: an overview).

• It handles the transition to market trading in a controlled way by seeding liquidity at a known price and moment.

• It introduces an innovative price-split mechanism to manage the token’s unit price and psychological affordability, using a rebase-like supply adjustment triggered by on-chain price oracles (Rebase Tokens Guide: What Are They & How Do They Work? | Koinly) (How Chainlink Price Feeds Work - RareSkills).

• It leverages the token to drive the growth of a decentralized infrastructure by rewarding node operators, similar to proven models in other decentralized networks (Understanding Helium: A Comprehensive Overview | Messari), ensuring the token is backed by real utility.

By following these designs and recommendations, the OpenVinoDAO development team can implement robust smart contracts that align with the Purple Paper’s vision and set the stage for a successful and sustainable ecosystem launch. Each contract should be audited and tested under various scenarios to ensure security and reliability, as the complexity (especially of the split mechanism) is non-trivial. With careful execution, OpenVinoDAO’s token can achieve a balanced tokenomics model that funds development, incentivizes participation, and adapts to market conditions over time.